Is Minilateralism a Source of Stability or Instability in the Indo-Pacific?

China’s economic and political rise has profoundly shaped the international relations and geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific. Its continued assertive aspiration to dominate the maritime domain and influence regional forums like ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) has forced several Indo-Pacific nations to reassess their security policies and strategies. This has led to the formation of minilateral groups like the Quad, Squad, AUKUS, JAPHUS, and JAROKUS, and other trilateral security dialogues. As per the current growth rate, minilateralism is expected to dominate the security scenario of the Indo-Pacific in the coming decades. However, the question is whether these minilaterals enhance the region’s stability or are destined to cause further instabilities.

Minilateral Groupings in the Indo-Pacific 

Minilaterals aim at strengthening flexible, issue-based, ad-hoc military, technological and economic cooperation among small groups of like-minded partners to address strategic challenges that cannot be effectively resolved through existing multilateral frameworks. Minilateralism has paved the way for smaller countries to engage extra-regional powers like the United Kingdom in countering China to create a free and open Indo-Pacific based on the rule of law.  

A concern regarding minilaterals is the potential for redundancy. While these minilaterals share a primary goal, each of these forums has been tailored to specific strategic goals and priorities of the member states. For instance, JAPHUS (Japan, the Philippines, and the United States) prioritizes economic growth and resilience, technology transfers, climate and clean energy cooperation, while AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) prioritizes deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases and supply chains. Meanwhile, JAROKUS (Japan, South Korea, and the United States) aims to deter nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea, and the Quad (India, Australia, Japan and the United States) focuses on the prosperity and stability of the Indo-Pacific based on the rule of law. Given India’s reluctance to make military partnership the core of the Quad, the United States has created another alliance called the Squad with Australia, Japan and Philippines who are all treaty allies of the United States. Therefore, these forums could be considered complementary to each other rather than being redundant.

Potential Effects in the Region

Minilateralism can be a stabilizing factor since it helps the littoral states balance against China’s aggression. The intensification of relations among members of the JAPHUS group is a recent example: the Philippines is getting reassurance and assistance from Washington and its allies in the Pacific in return for allowing Pentagon access to its northernmost base. Thus, while undertaking a massive $35 billion military modernization program itself, the Philippines has also become part of the U.S.-led integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. If these forums can secure the interests of all participating states, then this collective deterrence can enhance stability in the region. 

However, two issues could hamper their effectiveness in promoting deterrence and stability.  

First, China’s position as an economic powerhouse complicates regional states’ autonomous decision making in foreign policy. China is a crucial, if not the largest, trading partner for many states in the region, including U.S. allies such as Australia, whose exports to China in 2023 were AU$218.8 (US$135.5) billion, and the Philippines, for which China is the top trading partner. Therefore, no state will be willing to engage in any kind of alliance activity that provokes long-term tension with China. The United States must understand the priorities of the regional states for which economic benefits offered by China or any other external power outweigh the benefits of security or military commitment.

Second, minilateral groups are vulnerable to individual states’ flagging commitment to these initiatives. These minilaterals maintain a degree of strategic ambiguity to remain flexible to emerging scenarios and thus create uncertainty about the commitment of members and the scope and depth of the groups’ engagement strategy. Ineffectiveness from one member can result in a frozen dialogue. Moreover, engaging in cooperation and negotiation with small and second-tier states, like Indonesia, will be difficult through such minilateral forums. These nations often prioritize more inclusive multilateral forums like ASEAN. Therefore, gaining their trust and vigorous participation will be a challenging task, thereby limiting the effectiveness of minilaterals in times of crisis as platforms for deterrence or dispute settlement.

Net Assessment

Minilaterals have the potential to balance the China threat by bolstering the U.S.-led security architecture in the region, but cases of failure, like Quad 1.0, are also evident. Ensuring sustainable commitment from partners, understanding the priorities of the small littoral states, and strengthening economic and diplomatic ties accordingly are essential for the success of minilaterals. U.S. President Joe Biden’s inconsistent participation in major Asian summits and events has already created a gap that needs to be mended. With U.S. President Donald Trump in power for the next few years, we expect to see heavier pressure on China in areas of trade relations, but the possibility of withdrawing from these partnerships also remains high. Considering the growing military, economic, and diplomatic influence of China, a strategy of withdrawal might cause irreparable damage to the U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific.

Navy ships from the United States, Australia, Canada and South Korea steam in formation during a Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2008 exercise group photo off the coast of the Hawaiian Islands. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Kyle D. Gahlau/Released)